Review of Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies (Part Two)

   This discussion is the second and concluding article reviewing the book by Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism.1 A brief evaluation of what his book offers to the overall discussion of science and religion will follow. His primary theme, which he mentions several times throughout, is there is superficial conflict, but deep concord, between science and religion, and superficial concord, but deep conflict, between science and naturalism. Consequently, according to Plantinga the real source of the disagreement is between religion and naturalism. To be clear, Plantinga’s point is the atheism of Dawkins, Dennett, and others with their trash talk about theism makes the mistake that must be addressed. It is not that science is opposed to theism, so much as is naturalism. Plantinga argues these “super atheists” have taken science and have tried to argue it supports naturalism, when, in fact, it does not.

PART III
Concord
   In Part II Plantinga discusses the appearance of design in the world. Does science support arguments for theism? In this section (Part III) he discusses arguments of fine tuning, that is, scientific discoveries in physics and astronomy. Do they offer a premise for a theistic argument (194)?2 He also includes a discussion from biology pertaining to the nature and character of life. Plantinga seems to be sympathetic to design arguments for existence. However, design may not be looked upon as an inference, but more as a perception, he asserts. Ultimately, he reasons the fine tuning arguments may cause atheists to elevate the probability of theism. Once again, nothing is really proven, but with careful consideration the theistic position may be more likely than it was before. He defends Behe’s “irreducibly complex” arguments as being modern arguments from design (237). Plantinga says they go back to the “fifth way” of Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas there are five ways to demonstrate God’s existence, 1) from motion to the Unmoved Mover, 2) from effects to a First Cause, 3) from contingent being to a Necessary Being, 4) from degrees of performance to a Most Perfect Being, 5) from design in nature to a Designer of nature. Plantinga sees the “fine tuning” arguments offered as falling into the fifth way. Perhaps William Paley’s watchmaker analogy is the most famous formulation of the argument from design to a divine designer. Plantinga references William Paley’s version of design reasoning, but ultimately he is quick to dismiss the force of such.

PART IV
Deep Conflict
   In Part IV Plantinga discusses the deep conflict between science and naturalism. However, even here Plantinga does not prove naturalism false; rather he holds one cannot espouse both naturalism and the contemporary scientific theory of evolution. His argument may be set forth in the following manner:

1.  The Probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given naturalism, together with the proposition we have come to be by way of evolution is low (cf. 317).

2.  Anyone, who accepts (believes) naturalism and evolution and sees that the probability is low has a defeater for the reliability of our cognitive faculties. (cf. 339, 40).

3.  Anyone, who has a defeater for the reliability of our cognitive faculties, has a defeater for any other belief he perceives he has, including naturalism and evolution itself (cf. 343, 440).

4.  If one who accepts naturalism and evolution thereby acquires a defeater for naturalism and evolution, naturalism and evolution is self-defeating and cannot rationally be accepted (cf. 344).

5.  Therefore, naturalism and evolution cannot rationally be accepted.

    Most of his discussion is given to premise one. According to Plantinga the conflict really lies between theism and naturalism. The argument asserts naturalism and evolution are self defeating; arguing that religion is more hospitable to science, than naturalism. He reasons that the probability a human belief is true will be low, if naturalism and evolution are both true. Once again, the argument does not bring religion and science any closer than before the argument.

A Brief Evaluation
   The Christian apologist is going to be disappointed, as he works his way through this rather dense work and discovers Plantinga’s way of handling the perceived conflicts between these areas of thought. Discussion was given in the first installment on how he bases Christianity on a denominational format, foreign to New Testament Scripture. A non-denominational outlook never occurs to these writers, because they proceed from a false premise initially and are hamstrung in either dealing with the issue, or solving it. Plantinga has problems with the latter, since his Dutch Calvinistic background poses real difficulties approaching the issue of existence. These hitches are equally true for Dennett and Dawkins, as they approach theism through denominational glasses. The Calvinistic view of sensus divinitatis (the innate sense of the divine that everyone is supposed to have) is evidently not working well for some. If man is determined Calvinistically, then why does it all matter anyway? The atheist cannot change, even if he desired.

   Plantinga never makes reference to the biblical view of creation, leaving one to wonder how Genesis 1 and 2 are to be understood in light of the biblical view of inspiration and his view of embracing evolutionary biology. He will admit the Christian is to accept the scientific theory of evolution and, in effect, tosses the creationists overboard. Dennett and others are the ones misreading Darwin, Plantinga argues. When one interprets Darwin properly, then the Christian should accept his view. Their belief that evolution rules out the existence of God—including a God who purposely created human beings through a process of guided evolution—is not a scientific claim. However, Plantinga’s view does not fair much better—God used evolutionary processes to guide the mutations along their way—so that life is the result of a type of divinely orchestrated evolvement. So, where is the evidence for that? On the age of Earth and the eons necessary for evolution of life, he points to Augustine’s assertion that each of the first six days of Genesis could be eons long. He works at reconciling the principles of religion with science. However, these are concessions the Christian apologist is not willing to make. One begins to wonder if Plantinga is as interested in reconciling religion and science, as he is in carving up religion.

   Plantinga’s argument and the book itself leave little to hang one’s hat on concerning origins. At best, one becomes agnostic regarding naturalism and the contemporary view of evolution. With Plantinga the issue is less likely that one can know given naturalism, and that one could never really say, “I know God does, or does not, exist.” He claims both cannot be true at the same time, but we are still left in the agnostic camp, regarding God and His existence. Hence, Plantinga has not really furthered the discussion regarding maximal greatness being instantiated, i.e., God. Though his book for the apologist is serious reading, and I find myself cheering him on when he argues against zoologist Richard Dawkins and philosopher Daniel Dennett, the thoroughgoing theist is going to find Plantinga’s work disappointing for several reasons.

   Plantinga does not, nor does he try to, prove the existence of the God of the Bible. This is the ultimate question, “Does the God of the Bible really exist?” Perhaps Plantinga might respond he was not really trying to prove such, as this focus is beyond the scope of the book. He might say he was merely trying to clarify the discussion “where the conflict really lies.” However, to the apologist this defense might seem a bit academic. Do we not know “where the conflict really lies?” Do we not already know it is at least possible for God to intervene into the world? What Plantinga attempts to add to the discussion is to say such is not so opposed to science, as the modern, radical atheist would have us believe. However, if we redefine the scope of religion by viewing it denominationally and limiting contemporary science to exclude naturalism, then the result can be somewhat contrived. Plantinga tells us the real conflict is between naturalism and religion; not contemporary evolution and religion. I disagree.

   Further, Plantinga completely disregards the biblical text. When one deals with religion and origins, it would seem he should take his lead from what one can know from the biblical text itself about origins, especially when discussing “what God could have done,” as opposed to “what God did do.” Plantinga argues God could have guided the development of lower life forms, making the needed mutations come out just right at the right time. Where did he get such an idea? The apologist wants to know more than supposing God could have done it that way. He wants to know what God actually did and can we know it. Plantinga reasons we should accept the contemporary view of evolution to be a guided process by God. Why should I? To assert God did do so lacks proof, both biblically and scientifically.

   Plantinga is basically arguing theism is vastly more hospitable to science, than naturalism. However, objectively speaking, even with Plantinga’s analysis, naturalism still survives, not as being untenable, but as being less probable than at the beginning of the book. One wonders if even he has settled the conflict between science and religion? NO, he has not. Try our best, the two, science and religion, will not be able to live peaceably beside each other.

 Notes

 1 The reader is referred to my earlier article in Sufficient Evidence, in which Plantinga’s Part I Alleged Conflict, and Part II Superficial Conflict, are briefly presented and discussed.

2 Design arguments have taken many forms; however, a more recent vintage is the so-called fine tuning arguments that reason from more recent discoveries of the conditions of the universe, allowing for life given a very narrow and constant range. Life could only remain, if the fundamental laws of physics and nature remain in that constant range; inferring divine design. See P. C. W. Davies, (2003) “How Bio-friendly is the Universe” in Int. J. Astrobiol 2 (115).

Jim Laws studied Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics under Thomas B. Warren at Harding Graduate School of Religion. He has also studied Philosophy at the University of Dallas, Middle Tennessee State University, and Tennessee Bible College (Ph.D.). He earned the JD degree from Concord School of Law in Los Angeles, CA. He resides in Tyler, TX, where he serves as minister for Broadway Church of Christ. Mr. Laws may be contacted at lawspublishing@hotmail.com.