Knowing that We Can Know (Part One)
Finding Our Way Out of the Morass of Epistemological Skepticism
Following the Dark Ages, two very powerful cultural forces emerged in Europe. One movement was the Protestant Reformation while the other was the Renaissance. The great figures of the Reformation are noted in most courses on Western Civilization. However, in most secular institutes of higher learning, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and especially the success of the Natural Sciences, are more closely studied. Modernity is essentially understood as the triumph of Naturalism as a worldview (cf. Baumer)1.
The Philosophy of Scientism
The nihilistic implications of naturalism have been kept hidden from the general public through a massive propaganda campaign by the scientific community. The wonderful advances of the natural sciences (which perfectly complement a theistic worldview) have been made to fit into a philosophical worldview wherein all metaphysics are excluded. This, of course, excluded God, angels, and all supernatural entities. But, it also posed insuperable difficulties for the traditional questions with which metaphysicians trouble themselves (the mind-body issue, freedom vs. determinism, space and time, being and nothingness, etc.). Whenever naturalists are pressed for an ultimate explanation as to how all things began, they inevitably ask, “Well, who made God?” Since, in a purely naturalistic framework, all reality (including God) is within the parameters of the physical universe, they believe that God was created by human beings, rather than the other way around.
But, it was not always this way. The university movement began roughly in the middle of the 13th century as theistic centers of higher learning. The first scientists were almost always theists who were convinced that, in their amazing discoveries, they were merely thinking God’s thoughts after Him. Slowly, over time (hastened by the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species), serious philosophical challenges emerged against metaphysics and epistemology. Naturalists came to believe that they now had the tools to exclude metaphysics once and for all. For instance, Carl Sagan opened his award winning Cosmos series with the following terse comment: “THE COSMOS IS ALL THAT IS OR WAS OR EVER WILL BE” (4, emp. added). His successor, Neil Degrasse Tyson, self-professed agnostic, said: “I want to put on the table, not why 85% of the members of the National Academy of Sciences reject God, I want to know why 15% of the National Academy don’t.2” Tyson holds to the God of the gaps theory, meaning that, though we do not know it now, future scientific discoveries will continue to make God not only unnecessary, but a non-entity. This is not legitimate science, but rather what is sometimes called methodological naturalism. It is the philosophy of scientism. Scientism is the view that all knowledge and truth come through the sciences. To see just how extreme this view is, consider the incredible statement of Bertrand Russell: “Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods, and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know” (243).
In a recent debate with William Lane Craig, Peter Atkins, former professor of Chemistry at Oxford University, asked: “Do you deny that science can account for everything?” He had made these observations in the debate, indicating his strong adherence to the philosophy of scientism. Craig responded: “Yes I do deny that science can account for everything.” Atkins pressed Craig, “[S]o what can’t it account for?” Craig listed five things:
I think that there are a good number of things that cannot be scientifically proven, but that we’re all rational to accept. Let me list five. [First], logical and mathematical truths cannot be proven by science. Science presupposes logic and math so that to try to prove them by science would be arguing in a circle. [Second], metaphysical truths like there are other minds than my own, or that the external world is real, or that the past was not created five minutes ago with the appearance of age are rational beliefs that cannot be scientifically proven. [Third], ethical beliefs about statements of value are not accessible by the scientific method. You can’t show by science that the Nazi scientists in the camps did anything evil as opposed to the scientists in Western democracies. [Fourth], aesthetic judgments cannot be accessed by the scientific method because the beautiful, like the good, cannot be scientifically proven. And [finally], most remarkably, would be science itself. Science cannot be justified by the scientific method, since it is permeated with unprovable assumptions. For example, the special theory of relativity–the whole theory hinges on the assumption that the speed of light is constant in a one- way direction between any two points, A and B, but that strictly cannot be proven. We simply have to assume that in order to hold to the theory. (Atkins and Craig)
In the early part of the 20th century a movement was begun to eliminate all metaphysics from academic discourse. “God talk” became a very common back and forth in the journals and on the lecture circuit. Statements about metaphysical entities, especially in our context of theology and ethics, were held to be meaningless. The reason for this pronouncement was the excessive overconfidence of many in the scientific method. A new expression began to be heard in academic circles. It was called the verifiability principle. Popularized by A. J. Ayer, whose reliance on the famed Vienna Circle was acknowledged, this principle held that, for any statement to be meaningful, such statements were either true by definition (e.g., every college coed is female, all unmarried men are bachelors, every married man is a husband, etc.) or such statements were verifiable (meaning that they could be validated by empirical investigation) (cf. 5-26). If statements fell into neither of these two categories, that statement was considered to be factually meaningless (nonsensical) since they were incapable of being empirically verified. Since “God exists” is neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable, it follows that such a statement was held to be meaningless or nonsensical. The same would be true for any characteristic of God, such as God’s omnipotence, omnipresence, etc. In short, all theological statements were thought to be without any meaning whatever.
How should one respond to such forthright positions? It did not take very long for philosophers to discover that the verifiability principle which was so highly touted by logical positivists was itself neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable. Therefore, by the conditions marked out by Ayer and others, the verifiability principle was nonsensical (meaningless). This attempt to abolish metaphysics from academic discourse was short-lived and an abject failure. With respect to Russell’s statement that all knowledge is obtained by means of the scientific method, it is quite clear that Russell’s conclusion is not itself a product of the scientific method. It is also self-defeating for one to claim, as did Peter Atkins, that we get all our truth from science. This is not a scientific truth, and thus, the claim is self-contradictory. In fact, Professor Ayer was completely correct when he stated, “[N]o empirical propositions are certain, not even those which refer to immediate experience” (28, cf. 91-94).
Is it possible that other motivations are at work here? From comments such as those of Richard Lewontin of Harvard University, it is clear to me that this is the case. His methodological naturalism, and anti-metaphysical bias are glaringly apparent:
Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover that materialism is absolute for we cannot allow a divine foot in the door. (31, emp. added)
When we are wrestling with epistemological certainty, we are necessarily dealing with foundational principles. These thoughts were compiled in a debate that I enjoyed with the late Arlie Hoover, former professor of history and philosophy at Abilene Christian University (cf. Sztanyo 474-77). First, let me mention the principle of non-contradiction, a metaphysical first principle which also has important applications in logic. The laws of logic (sometimes called laws of thought) are actually derived from the metaphysical first principles of being. That is, the laws that govern human thinking are a reflection of the necessities found in nature (reality). As such, there is an important parallel between thought, being, and language. The metaphysical principle is, “a being cannot both be and not be at the same time and taken in exactly the same sense.” This principle holds true even for those things that I will never see at all (such as hell). I know, with indubitable certainty that the universe cannot both exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense. Hence, any proposition I formulate about the universe logically, will be either true or false. It cannot be both. That is, if I assert the universe does not exist, my assertion will be either true or false. It literally cannot be both. The reason it cannot be both true and false is because such does not obtain in reality. If it could, then the logical principle of non-contradiction (contradictory propositions cannot both be true and not true) could not hold. No one can deny this principle without appealing to the principle in order to formulate his denial. If I say, “The principle of non-contradiction is false,” then my statement is either true or false. It cannot be both true and false. Unless I am prepared to affirm that contradictory propositions are either always both true or that they may possibly both be true, then my denial is self-defeating. All perceived objects are distinguished on the background of this principle. For example, no perceived object can be both a door and not a door at one and the same time and in the same sense. The object is either a door or it is not a door. It is impossible to make distinctions in perceived objects without an intuitive awareness of the principle of non-contradiction. It is a necessary and self- evident state of affairs. It is known with absolute certainty.
Second, there is a strict impossibility that any perception is grasped with a greater degree of certainty than the one who is the subject of such a perception. Since perception is an act of a conscious subject distinct from other acts of a conscious subject (such as willing, feeling, thinking, remembering, etc.), it shares the same basic characteristics of all such conscious activity. “I” am the one who thinks, who wills, who feels emotionally, who remembers, and who perceives. In spite of the fact that each perception is totally new even with reference to the same object of perception at different times, it is still one and the selfsame “I” who perceives. I am always immediately aware of my own existence and its unity as well as my own conscious activity. The acts of consciousness which I, as a conscious subject perform, literally cannot be known with greater certainty than my own self-awareness. Such is patently absurd. Any act of consciousness presupposes a conscious subject who performs such an act.
Furthermore, one’s reason is the power and function of grasping necessary connections. Many things in the world could have been otherwise. The pen with which I composed this paper was red; but, it could have been black or some other color. Whatever color my pen happens to be, it could have been colored differently, but it is necessarily the case that my pen could not have been red all over and black all over at the same time and in the same sense. The necessary truth that my pen is red all over and not at the same time black all over cannot be a function of sense experience. Sense experience may be able to report what is the case at a particular time. But, sense experience is incapable of grasping what must be at all times.
Whatever criteria are used to distinguish perceived objects from one another, and illusion, delusion, and deception from reality, are non-empirical and operate in the background of any perception. Even if I have an illusory experience, or I am either deluded or deceived, still it is “I” who have the illusory experience, it is “I” who am deluded, and it is “I” who am deceived. Any acts of a conscious subject presupposes an intuitive awareness of self-existence. Such is known by that person both non-empirically and absolutely. To summarize, it is strictly impossible for an act of consciousness to be known with greater certainty than the conscious performance by and self-existence of the subject of those acts. In other words, I know with undeniable certainty that I do exist and that I perform certain conscious activities, including acts of perception and including acts of understanding of any given biblical passage.
Third, I will simply list a number of propositions which are known with absolute certainty and which are all non-empirical truths. I challenge anyone to deny that the following are known intuitively and indubitably: (1) justice cannot be attributed to impersonal beings, (2) moral virtue presupposes freedom, (3) every judgment (statement or proposition) makes a claim to be either true or false, (4) responsibility presupposes freedom, (5) every change presupposes a sufficient cause, etc. I insist that each of these represents a necessary state of affairs. As such, they are all capable of being known with a greater degree of certainty than empirical forms of knowledge, which never represent necessary states of affairs.
Fourth, Dr. Hoover had agreed to defend the following proposition: “In general matters of human knowledge, things not perceived through the senses are matters of faith and do not provide the certainty of empirical knowledge.” My proposition was the exact contradictory of his, and was stated as follows: “Some non- empirical propositions may be known with greater certainty than empirically perceived things.” My proposition obligated me only to prove a greater degree of certainty for those non-empirical matters. However, I intended to go beyond that to show that some things may be known with absolute certainty. Incidentally, Dr. Hoover’s own proposition was a non-empirical truth claim as was mine. Since he held that no empirical truth may be known with absolute certainty, and all non-empirical propositions are known with less certainty than empirical propositions, it follows that his proposition could not possibly have been known to be true. He may have believed it to be so, but he could not have known it to be as certain as the weakest empirical perception. Since my proposition contradicted his, and since contradictory statements are so related that, if one is true, the other is necessarily false, and since he could not know that his proposition was true, it follows with inescapable force that he could neither prove nor know that my proposition was false. When we are dealing with questions of epistemology, we simply must be clear in our thinking.
Fifth, even though I did not refer to this during the debate, I must also mention the principle of causality. This important principle is also known intuitively, and not by either induction or deduction. Indeed, as with other first principles, every attempt to deny it somehow presupposes it. In fact, the very denial of causal necessity implies some kind of causal necessity in the denial. For, unless there is an ontological ground (cause) for the denial, then the denial does not necessarily stand. If there is an ontological ground or cause for the denial, then the denial is self- defeating. This is so because one would be using a necessary causal connection to deny that there are necessary causal connections. Even the empiricist skeptic David Hume (though he denied that one could ever experience causal necessity by means of the senses), refused to deny the principle of causality. He said when challenged on his position: “I never asserted such an absurd proposition as that anything might arise without a cause” (qtd. in Greig 187). As an example of this, consider the laws governing logic. These laws are essentially immaterial. They have absolutely nothing to do with empirical perception. Furthermore, for deductive arguments there is first a question of validity. This means that the conclusion follows from the premises as the argument states. The second consideration is soundness which means that one has a valid argument with true premises. Thus, the conclusion follows inescapably, and is absolutely certain. If we take a standard hypothetical syllogism [(1) If A, then B, (2) A, (3) Therefore, B] it can be correctly stated that the premises cause or explain the conclusion. Consequently, the conclusion is caused by the premises, and we have another wonderful example of the principle of causality, which is applicable to logical argumentation and which also has nothing to do with the physical universe.
The most important thing to remember about the principle of causality is that it is in no way dependent upon empirical perception. Instead, it is a universally applicable principle that cuts across all examined entities precisely because the principle itself is not visible. Can we conclude that something has no cause because the cause is not visible? How visible is gravity? Electricity? The atom? How visible are the powerful influences of desire, of love, of virtue? In all of these invisible areas, we know cause from the effects which by definition are caused. The best definition that I have seen of the principle that avoids the common objections and dodges is the following:
First of all, when one thing is observed to produce a particular thing . . . among the totality of possible conditions certain conditions must exist; there must be a set of necessary conditions. Secondly, unless all the necessary conditions are present, that particular effect will not occur. If even one necessary condition is not present, the effect in question will not occur. In other words, they must not only be necessary conditions; they must likewise be sufficient to produce the effect. Thus, we can analyze causality in terms of production, where the cause of an effect is the set of conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the production of the effect. (Reichenbach 47)
I have shown several examples of metaphysical principles that are in no way bound by the physical universe, but all of which may be known with absolute certainty. Moreover, these principles are assumed in order for any scientific investigation to occur at all. Can you imagine any naturalist doing his work without using the principles of non-contradiction, or of causality? Could any of us think of how any of this would occur without a consistently operating physical environment, a conscious observer who can make sense out of the order he sees, and the ability the scientist has to make reasonable predictions based upon repeated observations and testing of the various hypotheses that explain the observations? The incredible materialistic propaganda that leads to the philosophy of scientism is completely off base. In fact, such foolishness is demonstrably false, in spite of the fact that the influence of naturalism thoroughly dominates our institutions of higher learning, especially in the science programs. When this is discovered, you would think that people might want to return to a supernaturalistic worldview. Sadly, this has not occurred for the most part. Instead, many thinkers took a trip to the East. If naturalism proves to be impotent in obtaining final answers, many thought that perhaps the answers could be found in a spiritualist worldview (Pantheism). When that proved to be too bizarre for Westerners to accept, it was thought that perhaps a merging of Eastern and Western views in what came to be called the New Age Movement might be a good alternative. Even though the New Age Movement has had an impact in the West, and even though it warrants a reasoned response, I want to survey another extremely influential philosophy that has some speaking of this generation as those having their feet firmly planted in mid-air. This position is called postmodernism and will be addressed in a forthcoming article (Fall 2015).
Works Cited:
Atkins, Peter, and Craig, William Lane. “What is the Evidence for/against the Existence of God?” Reasonablefaith.org. 3 April 1988. Web. 15 May 2015.
Ayer, Alfred Jules. Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover, 1952.
Baumer, Franklin L. Modern European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950. New York: Macmillan, 1977.
Greig, J. Y. T., ed. The Letters of David Hume. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon, 1932.
Lewontin, Richard. “Billions and Billions of Demons.” The New York Review of Books. 9 Jan. 1997: 31.
McClish, Dub. Denton: Valid, 1983.
Reichenbach, Bruce R. The Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment. Springfield: Thomas, 1972.
Russell, Bertrand. Religion and Science. 1925. London: Oxford UP, 1980.
Sagan, Carl. Cosmos. New York: Random, 1980.
Sztanyo, Dick. “The Nature of Biblical Faith.” Studies in Hebrews. Ed.
Notes
1 This is one of the most useful surveys of the “Modernist” period. The book is a bit dated, containing nothing about postmodernism, but otherwise is extremely helpful.
2 This was a successor to the widely acclaimed series by Carl Sagan.
Sagan’s wife co-produced the new mini-series, which premiered in 2014 and which has been viewed by an estimated eight million people. The quotation cited was given in a 2006 lecture in San Diego, called “Beyond Belief: Science, Reason, Religion & Survival.” The quotation is found at the very end of a 41minute speech.