Knowing That We Can Know (Part Two)
Finding Our Way Out
of the Morass of Epistemological Skepticism
I wanted to mention the Spiritualist Worldview as a serious competitor to Christian Theism generally and, in particular, to New Testament Christianity. But, moving past this challenge, I want to discuss what has become a wildly pervasive philosophical movement known as “Postmodernism.” Modernity, generally speaking, is understood in the West as the naturalism that developed since the 1600s in the Enlightenment. Postmodernism is a wholesale rejection of the almost total deification of the scientific method within modernity.
Bertrand Russell (powerful modernist figure) had a brilliant student he never really fully understood. Ludwig Wittgenstein actually helped to push modern philosophy into taking a sharply linguistic turn. Today, much of philosophical analysis is actually linguistic analysis. Those who were wedded to (and many still are) the philosophy of scientism had convinced the intelligentsia that the universe is nothing but the mechanical interaction of purposeless bits of matter/energy. Nancy Pearcey comments:
As the arts lost status and prestige artists and writers found themselves adrift, without their historical functions in society. Many responded by going on the offensive, attacking the mechanistic science and industrial society that they regarded as dehumanizing–and that had made their own status so precarious. Today they continue to seek redress by demonstrating the superiority of their own new analytical tools of literary analysis and deconstruction. And why not apply those tools even to the sacrosanct area of science? If all texts can be deconstructed, what makes scientific texts immune to that process? (114)
Crystal Downing, Associate Professor of English and Film Studies at Messiah College, agrees with Pearcey’s assessment (53-123). Downing writes:
One of these [important influences] was Jean-Francois Lyotard, who by 1979 had published (in French) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. He defined postmodernism as “incredulity toward metanarratives.” Sometimes translated as “grand narrative,” a metanarrative is an overarching explanation for reality that grounds its truth in universal reason. Lyotard’s suspicion towards metanarratives is a reaction against the arrogant confidence of modernists who, thinking they have a special handle on truth, disdain narratives based on faith.
Another postmodern philosopher, Richard Rorty, indicted science a decade later, explaining how “the Enlightenment wove much of its political rhetoric around a picture of the scientist as a sort of priest, someone who achieved contact with nonhuman truth by being ‘logical,’ ‘methodical,’ and ‘objective.’” For Rorty, all truths, including those of science, are human: intellectual constructions taken as true by groups of people who share the same interpretation of reality. . . .
This explains why Lyotard and Rorty regard scientific explanations of reality as similar to religious ones: both must be judged by their internal coherence rather than their correspondence to reality. After all, they would ask, how can one judge a system’s correspondence to “reality” if reality is precisely what that system defines? It is like being both inside and outside a house simultaneously: an impossibility. (75-76)
I have been convinced for some time now that postmodernism will die a well deserved death much like the one experienced by the logical positivists, and largely for the same reasons, namely, the position ultimately collapses upon itself. But, due to the more widespread impact of postmodernism upon our culture today, it will take a little more effort to make this apparent.
I have written on this in my book Graceful Reason in the chapter on the nature of inspiration, but this is a question about epistemology. So, I will deal with the issue from that vantage point in this essay (with perhaps some overlap from the other discussion). I will look at the subject both philosophically and theologically, using the works of Crystal Downing, John Franke, and Myron Penner. During the course of the discussion, it will become apparent where my differences lie with this philosophical position. Philosophically, postmodernists deny all absolutes, including any transcendent truth (such as resides in God). Theologically, the writers I have just listed are eager to rescue transcendent truth; they just agree with their philosophical colleagues that we can never come to know it. The best way to see this is to explore a recent book by one author who seeks to end discussions of this sort.
The End of Apologetics
Myron Penner, a Priest in the Anglican Diocese of Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, wrote a fascinating book entitled, The End of Apologetics, He took his Ph.D from the University of Edinburgh, and has taught at Prairie College at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.
Since I am an apologist squarely within the Classical Tradition, I have taken a special interest in this book. It is not difficult to discover what Penner is arguing, for he says “This is a book about apologetics. Or, more precisely, it is a book against apologetics” (4). “I suggest modern Christian apologetics subtly undermines the very gospel it seeks to defend and does not offer us a good alternative to the skepticism and ultimate meaninglessness of the modern secular condition” (49).
I would agree with Penner on his difficulties with many modern apologists, although for quite different reasons than his. But, the glaring inconsistency of his viewpoint ought to be immediately evident to thoughtful readers. He has what amounts to an apologetic treatise against apologetics as a complete discipline, when he really means that he disagrees with a number of those writers who disagree with him. But then, his position seems on the verge of self-defeat, because he argues against arguments, contends against those who contend, disputes with the disputers, etc.
One reviewer listed ten points of disagreement with Penner, which I will list with minimal comment, except where an expanded treatment is required. His observations are all contained within the quotation marks unless I am quoting from a referenced author. First, “Penner claims revelation as his basis, but seldom quotes Scripture” (Rochford). Penner is enamored with Kierkegaard, who is referred to over 100 times, while explicit references to Scripture are used less than a dozen times.
Second, “Penner ignores the biblical texts that support Christian apologetics.” And, they are numerous (including Isaiah 41:21; 1 Timothy 6:12; Jude 3; 1 Corinthians 16:13-14; Philippians 1:7, 16; 1 Peter 3:15; etc. I have just touched the “hem of the garment” here).
Third, “Penner does not offer evidence for his postmodern view; he merely assumes it.” Penner writes: “Rather than arguing for the superiority of postmodernism, I assume postmodernism as a starting point and try to make this standpoint intelligible” (14). But, pray tell me, how can one make a position intelligible if there are no objective standards against which to measure it? If he tried to argue “for the superiority of postmodernism,” he would be contradicting everything he teaches about the subject. This inconsistency, however, is common with adherents of this false philosophy. His position is also characteristic of presuppositional apologetics where one assumes, rather than proves, his starting point. But, if we merely assume our position, why would–or should–anyone take us seriously at all? One could just as easily say that our opponents had also assumed their case. If this is so, then on what basis are one set of assumptions to be preferred over another?
Fourth, “Penner denies the importance of reason and truth.” Of course this is precisely the problem with his view, for without a reason for accepting Penner’s thesis as true, what rationale could anyone give for following him? He says:
Contingent “approximations” are all we finite, fallible creatures have available to us. Absolute, timeless truth is God’s alone. We perceive things from our various perspectives within time, with these limited and changing bodies, and from the social contexts we inhabit. We won’t, in other words, get to the bottom of reality to perceive reality as it really is apart from how it is for us. (109-10)
However, if something is merely true for me, then how could I possibly know that it would also be true for you, or for that matter, anyone else? The sheer subjectivity of this is mind-boggling.
Penner also goes so far as to argue that even unbelievers might possibly be saved (131, 140-141, 151). He speaks frequently of what he calls “apologetic violence,” and, in this context, he said: “I commit the first kind of apologetic violence when I treat those without my faith en masse under a universal category, such as unbeliever, so that their individual subjectivity is effectively erased or ignored” (148- 49). We should not be surprised that non-theistic postmodernists argue that truth is in no way objective. Richard Rorty, Philosophy Professor at the University of Virginia, for example, says that the key slogan of postmodernism is that “truth is made, not found” (3ff.). He continued: “Truth cannot be out there–cannot exist independently of the human mind–because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not” (5). What is truly incredible is that “theistic” postmodernists have taken positions that are really no different, except that they seem to use them in the service of a type of universalism. For example, Crystal Downing acknowledged her “faith crisis” when she came face to face with the view of truth as a plurality. Her struggles with C. S. Lewis’s The Last Battle are recounted, and she explains her position on evangelistic outreach, not as referring to persons who come to know and submit to the truth, but rather, as referring to persons who can be saved in spite of the fact that they live in different “towers” (her term for different religious and philosophical viewpoints). She argues that we can interpret John 14:6 differently, depending on which towers earnest followers of Jesus are situated (200-08). She says: “. . . Explicit belief is not necessarily a precondition for salvation” (203). “It’s just that the saving work of God Incarnate does not depend on human language–or even knowledge–to fulfill God’s purposes” (203).
The Truth will set you free–but not in order to autonomously choose from rival explanations of reality. The Truth will set you free from sin, a freedom made possible only within relationship. Forgiveness, whether human or divine, can only occur relationally, one person confessing so the other–including the Transcendent Other–can forgive.
Believing, in all humility, that we have been forgiven, Christians are called to do unto others as we would have them do unto us. This includes attempting to understand how and why people in other towers relate to the truth differently from the way we do. Remembering that Jesus provided light for the blind in radically different ways, we need to be open to what many Christians would call “the impossible”: the idea that people who do not see Jesus might eventually come to the light because of Jesus, the Truth who can relate to us whether we see him as Truth or not.
Absolute Love, after all, loves absolutely–despite our . . . relativism. (207-08)
Downing, amazingly, even refers to Rorty (an avowed atheist) as one who asserts that Christianity is somehow life affirming to a higher degree than other similar “towers.” Apparently, Downing thinks that even someone like Rorty may eventually be saved in spite of his non-theistic belief, but not because he actually comes to know that Christ is Lord, but because “the Truth . . . can relate to us whether we see him as Truth or not.” But, we all recognize that there is a huge difference between what God can do as opposed to what He will do (cf. Isaiah 59:1-2). God could save everyone, if and only if, His word means nothing at all, because His word teaches that He will save only the men and women of obedient faith (cf. John 3:16, 36; Hebrews 5:9; Matthew 7:13-14, 21-23, et al.).
Here is an important question for Rorty, Downing, and others who hold similar positions. Before there were any human beings on the Earth, was the statement “there are no human beings on the Earth,” true? One could easily say, as does Rorty, that there are no human beings to make statements, but that misses the point. Is it true that there were no human beings on the Earth at that particular time? Of course it is true and this demonstrates the fact that truth is not made by human beings, but rather, truth is discovered. In other words, the laws that govern logical statements have nothing to do with human invention. Neither are they changeable nor are they fallible. They are, in fact, universal. They govern all meaningful communication, without which none of us could carry on an intelligent conversation at all. In addition, and this is extremely important, this truth is an ontologically necessary truth, whether or not anyone ever formulates a logical statement to that effect. There is absolutely no dependency upon any human being actually offering a linguistic formula which states, “there are no human beings on the Earth.” If this were not the case, then no metaphysically necessary principles (such as the principles of non-contradiction, excluded middle, identity, causality, and the like) would ever be true. They would forever be dependent upon human invention and would have no status beyond that at all. There would be no truth at all to the metaphysical first principles, nor would there be any truth to the laws of logic. But then, we would all be using those principles in order to deny their truth value. In other words, the proposition that “no metaphysical first principles of being are true” is itself either true or false. It literally cannot be both. If it is true, then it is self-contradictory, for one is using laws of logic in order to affirm (in this case) a universal negative. But if false, then we must affirm the contradictory, namely, “some metaphysical first principles are true.” This is so, because if a universal negative is false, then its contradictory (a “particular affirmative”) is necessarily true. Our opponent is using the laws of logic in spite of his intense protests to the contrary.
Ontologically, God either exists or He does not. Epistemologically, we come to know this truth, based upon sufficient evidence to show that it is so. Ontology and epistemology are two very different considerations. Naturalists have been trying for years to destroy metaphysics. Postmodernists want to accomplish the same thing, but in a quite different way. Theological postmodernists want to keep metaphysics (at least, the “Transcendent God”), but they have cut off any epistemological ground to actually affirm it with certainty.
Rorty, Downing, Penner, and others do not mean for us to lack conviction that what they are telling us is true. Otherwise, why write the books to convince us? They do not simply want us to buy into a pragmatic theory of truth. Their theory may work for them, or it may even provide some “cash value” to them, but it does not necessarily work for anyone else. Likewise, they do not mean for us to simply believe that the coherence theory of truth is operative here. Many things can be internally consistent (they can “cohere”) without being actually true (for example, Calvinistic Theology, which is amazingly consistent if you grant its initial premises). They really want to convince us that their position is true, i.e. that it comports with reality. But, this is the “correspondence theory” of truth, the very theory of truth that they deny. If they are not trying to convince us that postmodernism is true, then why bother?
Fifth, “Penner claims that apologetics are abusive.” In typical postmodernist fashion, he favors “conversation” and “dialogue” over debate (68). Penner says, of those apologists with whom he disagrees:
My focus will be on what I argue about–the conclusions and propositions, the facts and the evidence to support them, and whether my opponent and I believe them–not how I engage another person. And, in the end, it will be difficult to escape the conclusion that my primary objective in an apologetic encounter is winning the argument. (143)
Penner refers to us as engaging in “ideological power plays” and that we are the “power-crazed crowd” who “assume the right to label those who disagree with us not only as ignorant and irrational but also as immoral and depraved” (61).
Do I need to remind you that abuse never bars use? There have no doubt been abusive apologists, but there have also been abusive husbands and wives, abusive Sunday School teachers, abusive elders, abusive professors, abusive Presidents, etc. Do we really want to do away with all of these worthy lifestyles or professions? Similarly, if and when abusive apologetics is discovered, one does not thereby uncover a reason for stopping the practice of good apologetics. It is only shown that the one who is abusive needs to change his methodology.
Furthermore, it is interesting to me that dialegomai, the Greek word from which our English dialogue is derived, actually refers to debating one’s cause. It is used 13 times in the New Testament and is translated variously as disputing, arguing, or discussing. There is no help for Penner’s viewpoint here, for his “linguistics” are used inconsistently with the true meaning of the word.
I am also interested in Penner’s amazing ability to read the hearts of men. As far as I have been able to determine, that ability belongs only to the Lord. So, how is it possible that he knows that apologists are abusive ideologues whose only motive seems to be to exercise power over others? When that attempt is unsuccessful, apparently Penner believes that we resort to using extremely pejorative language of our opponents (in short, they are irrational, ignorant, depraved, or other similar descriptions). I am puzzled as to how Penner could know this so certainly while he knows almost nothing else for certain. Dr. Thomas B. Warren was a masterful debater. He would press an opponent hard to expose error and inconsistencies, but still, he loved them all. I want to share a portion of his closing statement in a debate he had with the atheist Wallace I. Matson, in 1978. Warren said:
I am concerned about his life and all the problems he may have had as a child, for all the problems which he may have even now. And I assure you, Dr. Matson, that I have not neglected the passage to which you refer. I try to do as the Apostle Paul did, to preach the whole counsel of God. I try to preach that every man ought to love every other man on this earth; that if there is any answer to the racism we find in the world, it is in the religion of Jesus Christ; that the gospel has the great purpose of drawing all men in one body, that we may all be one in Christ, no matter whether you are from Africa, Europe, China, South America, or wherever. Paul makes this clear in Ephesians 2:13-16. And to intimate that we Christians do not love those who live in adultery or in homosexuality or that we do not love those who are even guilty of murder is to simply and flagrantly misrepresent us. The fact that we point out that these things are sin and that those who live in willful disobedience and who die in that condition will be lost, does not mean that we do not love them! . . . .
. . . And the Lord Jesus Christ who loved every person, even Wallace Matson, who was aware of his unhappy childhood, is aware of his problems even today, who loves him in spite of all that he has said against Him and who would forgive him–even as he would have forgiven Judas, if Judas had come to Jesus in penitence and, in effect, fallen down and said, “O Lord forgive me, I know I have been wrong.” Our Lord would have been as willing to put His arm around Judas, in love, kindness and forgiveness, as He did around Peter. Peter denied Him; Judas betrayed Him. But Peter repented! And whose sermon do we have recorded in the second chapter of Acts but that of Peter? Dr. Matson, that’s Christianity! (Warren and Matson 343-44)
Dr. Penner, was that abusive? Is it possible that you are perhaps only being autobiographical, and that you are misrepresenting many others with whom you do not agree? Is that just an “ideological power play” on your part?
Sixth, “Penner seeks to replace a correspondent view of [truth] with an ‘edification view.’” This, within postmodernism, is truly bizarre and flatly inconsistent as I have already mentioned and to which I will try to bring even more clarity in a moment. Beside Penner’s view, we should also consider his colleagues. For instance, for Crystal Downing, truth is a “neo-pragmatism” and is inherently “relational” (204-08). For John Franke, truth is “pluralism.” He is especially unhappy with those who ask the question, “do you believe in truth?” (11-19). He said:
Personally I will admit that I am beginning to find the question more than a little annoying, especially from people who are critical of Emergent Village [a haven for postmodernist theologians] and claims to know something about it on which to base their criticism. Instead of asking ‘Do you believe in truth?” Since we clearly state that we do . . .
And, anyway, what do people really mean when they ask the question. Are they asking if someone believes in their understanding of truth, truth as they see it? The implication being that they and their community of reference have the truth and therefore anyone who does not agree with them obviously does not believe in truth. (2)
Franke rejects cultural relativism, as do I, but then he distinguishes between Capital T Truth and small t truth. He further distinguishes between what God knows and what we know (13-18). His point:
. . . All human knowledge is understood as finite and limited, that is to say, it is situated in particular circumstances, and these circumstances have a significant effect on the character and content of that knowledge. . . . We can affirm the reality of ultimate or transcendent truth even as we acknowledge the interpretive character of human knowledge. (15)
Franke’s proof for the plurality of truth is the fact that religious groups differ. Diversity is the real truth (21-43).
Does the fact that truth is transcendent and absolute, inherent in the Absolute Being, prove that we cannot come to know any of it with certainty? Does it follow that truth is a plurality simply because of denominational diversity? Is it not possible that one tradition could really understand the truth while others adopt positions contradictory to truth? Is this really not possible at all? Can I not grant that all human knowledge is finite (limited and imperfect) while still maintaining that I can know the truth with absolute certainty in some cases? And, on the ground marked out by postmodernist theologians, how is it possible to truly know that truth is transcendent? One may choose to assume that it is true, but why should I, or anyone else, subscribe to that position? In other words, why should I accept the assumptions of Franke, Penner, Downing, or anyone?
None of these theologians are going to consistently stay with their theories. Let me give a useful example from the last century. One of our brethren challenged me once by saying, “You do not have absolute knowledge about anything. If you do, why do you study?” (Sztanyo 87). This writer, along with many others, took the position that, if one claimed to know anything with absolute certainty, he was, in effect, also claiming to be God! And, he was affirming a universal negative. Aristotle used a device in classical logic called the “square of opposition.” Classical logic refers to class (category) inclusion or class exclusion. If a certain class (category) depicted as P is related to another class, depicted as Q, then there are four possibilities. P is completely included in Q (this is called an A proposition). P is completely excluded from Q (this is called an E proposition). P is partially included in Q (this is called an I proposition). Or, P is partially excluded from Q (this is called an O proposition). Our brother had actually affirmed, “No matters which may be known are matters which may be known with absolute certainty.” In other words, the class of those things which may be known is considered to be completely excluded from the class of those things known with absolute certainty. The contradiction of an E proposition is an I proposition, which affirms: “Some matters which may be known are matters which may be known with absolute certainty.” In other words, there are some things that may be known which are also included in the class of those things known with absolute certainty. This is certainly no attempt to claim omniscience (as is the case with God), because there are many things that fall outside those matters which we may know with absolute certainty. But, it is a far different matter to claim that there are no such things! As a matter of fact, such an affirmation is itself a claim to know with absolute certainty the truth of an E proposition. This is blatantly self-contradictory. If our brother would have backed off this claim, then the alternative is to affirm precisely the same position as held by myself, namely, that “some things which may be known are things which may be known with absolute certainty.” This is all that I have ever affirmed, and incidentally, this is to affirm that such judgments that may be affirmed actually correspond to reality–the very thing that Penner denies (along with most, if not all, of his postmodernist colleagues).
Seventh, “Penner exaggerates the inability of language to communicate truth.” This was what Richard Rorty argues when he says: “Truth cannot be out there–cannot exist independently of the human mind–because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there” (5). Penner says:
[L]anguages we speak and the truths we tell, and even the insights we have, are all set within the contexts of the social and cultural practices of our various and sundry communities, which form perspectives through which we perceive the world and apprehend truths. But it also means that when we try to theorize about truth (that is, when we try to describe what truth is) using concepts like “correspondence”–so that we can somehow get at it from behind, underneath, or outside the concrete practices which we make, speak, and act–we will not have much luck. There is no further illumination to be had in that direction. We keep hitting dead ends. The concept of truth, at bottom, resists deeper analysis. So there is a kind of theoretical ambiguity about truth that ultimately we will have to content ourselves with, quite apart from the very definite, practical certainty of truth we gain from participating in various practices. (118)
This is precisely the same in meaning as Wittgenstein’s “Language Games.” There is no real connection between the world of reality and the descriptors we use to speak of it, according to these thinkers. Doug Groothuis had, I think, the best response to this line of reasoning that I have seen, so, I will use his argument in my own response. He said:
The classical distinctions between minds, beliefs and reality have been blurred by postmodernists who reject the correspondence theory of truth as modernist fiction. They conflate these categories by claiming that truth is not established by anything outside of the mind or the culture that shapes beliefs. The word truth is simply a contingent creation of language, which has various uses in various cultures. It expresses certain purposes, customs, emotions and values, but it cannot be said to represent or mirror reality itself. Our access to the territory of reality is through our language which acts as a map. But we cannot check the map against the territory, since we can know nothing outside our language. Thus, language becomes a kind of prison of signifiers that can never connect with the signified outside of itself. When language attempts to refer to anything outside language itself, it fails. We should not even expect it to succeed. (93)
Postmodernists argue that semantics and syntax are contingent and arbitrary. They are simply human constructions. We have many different languages and translations between them are often quite difficult. In fact, the way we understand reality, postmodernists say, is somewhat dependent upon the nature of one’s language. But, even though the terms used to describe various objects can be arbitrary, this has no bearing on the use of such terms to designate the reality to which they refer. In other words, there is nothing in the essence of the word “apple” that requires that we call it an “apple.” That, however, does nothing to dispense with the ability of descriptors to point accurately to the object being considered. Groothuis continued:
Postmodernists have confused the relativity of term selection (semantic variation) with an inability of language to represent objective reality. This is like saying that because we can drive any number of different cars, trucks, bicycles or motorcycles, we can never arrive at the same destination. Semantic and syntactical differences do not annul the ability of language to refer to realities outside of itself, or to refer to its own objective realities successfully. We do not create different worlds through our languages as the postmodernists would have it, but we do use varying descriptions of the actual world, which either correspond or fail to correspond to the world that is there. (95)
If language is really that impotent to communicate and transmit truth, then why write books trying to convince us of that specific truth? Obviously, the language used in the book is meant to accurately communicate and transmit this truth to us. Is this not, self-defeating?
In fact, why would God author a book to both promote and defend truth? Are we so fallible that we are completely incapable of grasping truth? Is it really true that God exists; that the Bible communicates His will to us; that the Christ really is Lord and Savior of mankind? Granted, we are finite whereas God is infinite, and we are fallible while God is infallible. But, are we really prepared to argue that it is totally impossible for God to communicate His will to the very ones He created? If we humans are just playing “language games” (cf. Penner 117-18, 120, 142), and if the Bible is written in human language by humans (we hold to a view of inspiration whereby God used human writers to communicate to us–plenary verbal inspiration), then how would we have any assurance that God is not merely playing a “language game” with us? How would we ever know otherwise? As a consequence, not only is Penner’s position self-contradictory (for he wrote a book seeking to convince us of the truth of his position), but, as a theologian, one wonders how he would ever have any confidence in his “Christian” beliefs? I have some measure of respect for Kierkegaard’s philosophical views too, but I am puzzled as to how Penner knows that Kierkegaard is telling him the truth in his writings while, at the same time, he is completely oblivious to how others (including the Lord in the Scriptures) could be telling him the truth too.
Eighth, “Penner offers many false dilemmas throughout his book.” Without treating this essay as a crash course in logic, let me also say that the numerous fallacies in Penner’s book involved many more than the false dilemmas to which reference has been made. Because of space and time considerations, I will not take this up at this juncture.
Ninth, “Penner mischaracterizes his opponents in their character and beliefs.” This is to commit the “straw man” fallacy, which simply says that one erects a misleading position attributed to one’s opponent and then destroys that erroneous position. The attempt is to lead the reader to think that one has accurately responded to the opponent’s true beliefs. Penner equates the use of reason and evidence with “dominance,” “mastery,” “control,” (46) “coercion,” “force,” “intimidation,” and “militancy” (143-44). He describes the work of such apologists as attempts to “coerce my neighbor.” This proves, Penner suggests, that “I really don’t love my neighbor as I love myself” (147). Again, I will not elaborate further on this point, except to call attention to my previous discussion on linguistics.
Tenth, “Penner believes that appealing to academic authorites (whom he calls geniuses) is a faulty way to substantiate our beliefs.” An interesting “argument.” I suppose that Penner informs his students to refuse to cite bibliographic references in their papers, for such citations are really worthless to aid the student in coming to a better understanding of his subject matter. By the way, the same objection should be made about the dissertation that Penner wrote in order to obtain his doctorate. Still further, didn’t he use the academic authorities quoted in his book to substantiate his own beliefs? The only “language game” used in this case is the one Penner used to attempt to convince the rest of us that his position is true (i.e. that his view is truly the one that corresponds to reality). Not only is this self-destructive, but it is also highly hypocritical! By the way, doesn’t he treat Kierkegaard as an academic authority in this book? Interesting logic, is it not?
The Bottom Line
Penner uses a very strange word to describe what he views as the essential knife in the throat to modern apologetics. The word is OUNCE, and he describes it as follows:
In the modern philosophical paradigm, then, reason forms what I will call the “objective-universal-neutral complex” (OUNCE). I use this rather awkward language to signal that the view of reason that emerges in the modern public sphere is one that is re-construed as a distinctly human quality–or at least the quality of “mind” (versus matter). No longer is reason thought of as the structuring feature of the world external to the human mind, as in the premodern view. Instead, reason is internal to (and possessed only by) human beings in a way that is universal, objective, and neutral. Because of this, any rational person may judge the worthiness of any other belief. As universal, every reasonable human being possesses the ability to access the rational grounds for belief; as objective, every reasonable person possesses the ability to assess the grounds for belief; and as neutral, every reasonable person possesses the authority to judge the merits of any belief. It is this combination which, in the end, forms an imperative that every person must justify each and every belief–and, I should add, has a moral duty to accept only those beliefs genuinely known. (32)
This bizarre notion that reason is “the structuring feature of the world external to the human mind” fits better with the view of the idealists than the “premodern view” that Penner thinks he has uncovered. In other words, if the mind structures reality rather than reading data off of reality, then the perspectivalists are right. What we know is only what each person’s perspective happens to be. That is, unfortunately, the view of the postmodernists. Evidently, Penner sees this as the inherent problem with modernity, and thus also, with modern apologetics. If, on the other hand, we examine the essential nature of things, there is this marvelous interchange between ontology and epistemology. The knower faces the world of experience, and may in fact be quite uninterested in taking cognizance of any particular fact that he encounters. But, if he becomes interested in a particular thing encountered, say, in the essence of beauty or goodness, then the good philosopher will peel back the layers of extraneous data until he actually gets to the essence of the datum itself. He will not be an idealist, but rather, a realist. In this sense, I would fit myself into the mold of OUNCE as expounded by Penner. I would, however, reject his notion of an imperative to justify each and every belief, for many of the beliefs we humans hold, do not really need lengthy efforts of justification. Some do, and in this, I agree that there is an imperative to justify those beliefs.
Now, Penner goes on to then link modern apologists with modernists, and since he rejects any connection to modernity, he must also therefore reject modern apologetics. He says:
The breakdown in modern apologetic treatments of postmodernism like Moreland’s is that postmodernism is examined from the perspective of OUNCE. Of course, one may get a fairly good idea of how postmodernism looks through modernist eyes this way, but it is by no means the only or best way to understand postmodernism–and it certainly does not address how postmodernists think about themselves.
There is, therefore, a kind of intellectual astigmatism or blind spot produced by the perspective adopted by modern apologists, which enables them to treat postmodernism and modernism as similar types of philosophical positions. The ironic result is that modern apologists, for the most part, cannot see their own complicity with modernity– or, if they do, they associate themselves with only those parts of modernity that reinforce their assumptions about reason and faith. (40)
The charge is that modern apologists are really modernists in disguise rather than being somehow separate from modernity, but that they inconsistently tar both postmodernism and modernism with the same brush. Actually, this may be the mistaken view of some of our modern apologists, but I don’t see it as that widespread, for the following reasons. First, most modern apologists are not perspectivalists, or, neo-pragmatists. Neither do they accept the almost universal deification of science that I insist grew out of the Enlightenment. Modern science, as well as much of philosophy, does not accept Penner’s OUNCE perspective. There is a very intense effort to abolish metaphysics (all ontological reality). Postmodernists attempt to ignore metaphysics altogether, and focus the attention instead on epistemology. If one rejects epistemological absolutes, then he is a relativist. He may be an objective relativist or a subjective relativist. This is so, because the opposite of objective knowledge (truth) is subjectivism, not relativism. To give an example, one may be an objective relativist if he holds that certain data is accepted by consensus. It may differ from culture to culture, or country to country. For instance, one may believe that cannibalism is morally abhorrent in the United States, because this is the consensus viewpoint. However, in countries where this is regularly practiced, the consensus would be different. An objective standard is a standard outside oneself, to which we are supposedly amenable. Since the position is relative to the country (or culture) in which one lives, but objective within a given country, the position is an objective relativism. We are expected in the United States to be bound by the bureau of weights and measures in Washington D.C. These standards are objective, in that they have nothing to do with my individual likes or dislikes, but instead, are bound on me by consensus. But, most of the rest of the world operates on a different set of standards (the metric system). Consequently, those standards are objective to the people living in those countries. But, they are relative to the countries in which one resides as well. A subjective relativism, on the other hand, is a relativity that differs from individual to individual, since it is subject to one’s likes or dislikes, beliefs, wishes, tastes, etc.
Given this all too brief explanation, most modernists accept the possibility of objectivity in knowledge (as in scientific pursuits), but deny absolutes. Most postmodernists reject both absolutes and objectivity. So, the idea that modern apologists are confusing modernism and postmodernism is not true. At least it is not true insofar as this apologist is concerned.
We also should give some attention to the phenomena of knowledge. There is really nothing else like it in the entire universe, of which I am aware. An amazing subject-object encounter occurs in every act of cognition. That is, one may perceive many objects through the senses. One may conceive of numerous ideas without any of them being dependent upon the senses. An object of interest appears before our conscious spiritual gaze, which we then begin to examine. When I, as a conscious subject begin to examine the object of interest, there is an intentionality about my examination. I intend to learn as much as I can about this object of interest. When I become aware of its essential qualities, I take that knowledge into myself. It can, of course, be brought back to consciousness again and again in my memory. But, nothing is physically altered in any way in me. Unlike eating a meal and digesting the food, whereby my body is physically effected, nothing of this sort occurs at all in the act of knowing. I may be dramatically effected, though, in a spiritual sense. For instance, I may have just learned about God and my obligations toward the Ultimate Being, and this information will have made a tremendous change in me. That change, however, is not physical. In other words, it has no mass, is not extended in space, and has no shape. But that bit of cognitive awareness can alter my life now, and potentially into eternity itself. On the object side, we are looking carefully at the objects of our experience, whether objects within the physical universe or whether they are objects of metaphysical awareness. On the subject side, we are making our examination intentionally, using the best evidence available to us to come to knowledge of the reality that is outside ourselves. Modernists (at least, those wedded to the natural sciences) tend to think only in terms of the physical properties of things, and deny absolutes. Postmodernists tend to think only of the subjective side and focus much of their attention, not on the real world, but rather, in our linguistic descriptions of what we think the world is like.
Since we have found that there is absolute truth, and we can know some things with absolute certainty, we have effectively responded to both schools of thought. There will be some differences from thinker to thinker, but in a general sense, I believe that we have accomplished our goal. That goal is to somehow find our way out of the morass of epistemological skepticism, or should I actually say, epistemological nihilism.
Works Cited
Downing, Crystal L. How Postmodernism Serves (My) Faith: Questioning Truth in Language, Philosophy and Art. Grand Rapids: IVP Academic, 2006.
Franke, John R. Manifold Witness: The Plurality of Truth. Nashville: Abingdon, 2009.
Groothuis, Douglas. Truth Decay: Defending Christianity Against the Challenges of Postmodernism. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000.
Pearcey, Nancy. Total Truth: Liberating Christianity from its Cultural Captivity. Wheaton: Crossway, 2004.
Penner, Myron Bradley. The End of Apologetics: Christian Witness in a Postmodern Context. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013.
Rochford, James M. “A Critical Review of Myron Penner’s The End of Apologetics.” Evidenceunseen.org. 21 Jan. 2014. Web. 10 Nov. 2015.
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989.
Sztanyo, Dick. Graceful Reason: Studies in Christian Apologetics. Vienna: Warren Christian Apologetics Center, 2012.
Warren, Thomas B. and Matson, Wallace I. The Warren-Matson Debate on the Existence of God. Jonesboro: National Christian, 1978.